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In  the  present  study  we  intend  to  build  an  early  warning  system  based  on  the  banking  ratings’ 
deterioration, by means of the CAAMPL method. This technique supposes to identify the credit institutions 
the most exposed to risks. The analyzed period for the Romanian banking sector covers the time frame 
between 1998 and 2006. During this period, a deterioration of the banks’ financial status, caused by the 
experienced banking crisis, can be observed in a first stage, followed by a risks reduction in the period 
forerunning the burst out of the global financial crisis. This method will help us demonstrate that, whereas 
the size of the bank has a positive influence on the banking ratings, the shareholders’ quality does not have 
the same impact. 
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1. Introduction 
The early warning systems (EWS) enable to rapidly identify the difficulties of the economy, by 
means of signal disseminating indicators, fact which helps to undertake immediate measures so 
as to prevent the crises appearance. The goal of these methods used to quantify the stability is to 
provide a coherent structure in order to analyze the stability problems, to make possible the early 
identification of vulnerabilities, to encourage the preventive and corrective measures required to 
avoid financial instability. 
Generally,  the  early  warning  systems  are  used  due  to  their  capacity  to  forecast  the  crisis’ 
appearance, but they can at the same time be applied for other purposes. These techniques are 
equally used by the regulators to identify the banks which are the most exposed to risks. 
In this study, we intend to analyse the evolution of the banking ratings in Romania by means of 
the CAAMPL method which enables the identification of the most exposed to risk banks. The 
analyzed period covers the years 1998-2006 and the database used for the study is Bankscope 
Fitch  IBCA.  The  results  indicate  an  improving  of  the  banking  ratings  starting  with  2003. 
According  to  this  approach,  this  trend  mainly  occurs  with  the  large  banks  of  the  system. 
However, in respect of the shareholders quality, the outcomes are contrary to the expectations. 
The banks which have Romanian majority shareholders show a superior solidity level.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. The second section presents a short overview 
of  the  EWS  literature.  In  the  third  section,  we  describe  the  CAAMPL  method  used  for  the 
Romanian banking system. The next section analyzes the size effect and the shareholders quality 
effect (the literature point out the fact that the foreign shareholders have more important and 
consistent methods for controlling and managing the banking risks). The last section presents the 
conclusion of the paper.  
 
2. Literature overview 
The most important category of EWS is represented by those enabling the calculation of the 
probability  of  a  financial  crisis  appearance.  This  technique  covers  two  big  important  EWS 459 
 
approaches: the signal-based approach and the limited dependent variable approach, which is 
based on logit or probit models. Most of the studies test both methods in order to be able to 
compare the results. The first method is usually used for identifying the indicators which can be 
retained in the binomial or multinomial logit models.  
The signal-based approach knew a real success with the studies carried out by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999). The financial indicators’ behaviour before and during crisis periods is analyzed 
in  comparison  to  their  behaviour  during  normal  periods.  Numerous  studies  have  used  this 
method, mainly to identify the signals related to the appearance of a currency crisis (Vlaar, 2000; 
Bussières et Fratzscher, 2006; Răcaru et al., 2006).  
However, a more modern method for the identification of the probability for a crisis appearance 
consists  in  the  binomial  or  multinomial  logit  or  probit  type  regression.  Krkoska  (2000)  and 
Bussières et Fratzscher (2006) have used a binomial logit model to estimate the crisis appearance 
probability. Based on this model, Davis and Karim (2007) analyzed the probability of a banking 
crisis  appearance.  Finally,  Berg  and  Patillo  (1999)  bring  an  important  contribution  to  the 
application of the probit models.  
At the same time, another purpose of EWS usage is to identify the banks which are the most 
exposed to risks. We deal, in this case, with early warning systems for the detection of banks’ 
financial distress. Thus, Distinguin et al. (2006) have used a logit model to demonstrate the 
importance  of  the indicators  built  based  on  market data  development (beside the accounting 
indicators)  for  the  assessment  of  European  banks’  financial  distress.  This  financial  status 
deterioration was identified by means of the ratings provided by the external rating agencies and 
the outcomes led to the significant contribution of market indicators to the detection of banks 
financial distress. A similar exercise was performed by Poghosyan et Čihák (2009) who analyzed 
the European banks’ deterioration with the help of a logit model, focusing in the first phase on 
accounting data.  
 
3. The CAAMPL approach for the Romanian banking sector  
Cerna et al. (2008) describe a particular type of EWS which provides information on the banks’ 
solidity. This system is a banking rating or scoring system used by the National Bank of Romania 
(NBR) and it transmits signals on the fragility of credit institutions. We will use this technique to 
analyse the evolution of banking ratings in Romania and to relate these ratings to the size of the 
banks and to the quality of their shareholders.  
The  method  is  known  as  “banking  rating  and  early  warning  system”  and  represents  a 
microprudentiel EWS, which resembles to the Distinguin et al. (2006) method, but which uses 
however only accounting data and information on the quality of the banking management and of 
the shareholders. This technique is part of the “early warning systems applied by the regulation 
and surveillance authorities to identify the banks which are the most exposed to risks” (Lutton, 
2006).  
The architecture of the CAAMPL early warning systems used to determine the ratings’ trend 
presents two components (Moinescu, 2007): 
- a statistic model to assess the banking ratings downgrade probabilities; 
- qualitative estimations made by experts by means of complementary information.  
The  “CAAMPL”  system  takes  into  consideration  six  elements  which  characterise  a  bank’s 
activity and solidity: the capital adequacy (C); the assets’ quality (A); the shareholders’ quality 
(A); the management (M); the profitability (P) and the liquidity (L). These indicators enable the 
definition of a composite rating. Each of the six components is assessed on a scale from 1 to 5 
where the value “1” characterises the best performance level and the value “5” the weakest level. 
Four components (C – the capital adequacy, A – the assets’ quality, P – the profitability and L – 
the liquidity) are analysed in close connection with a set of indicators which can receive different 
ratings.  The  other  components  (A  –  the  shareholders’  quality  and  M  –  the  quality  of  the 460 
 
management) are estimated by the experts of the NBR on the basis of the information gathered 
during the control missions performed at the banks’ premises (on-site). 
After  the  assessment  of  the  six  components  specific  for  the  performance  (CAAMPL),  the 
composite rating is established according to a rating scale from 1 to 5. A particular importance is 
given to the quality of the management which receives a significant weight within the composite 
rating. If one of the components was evaluated to a rating equal to 5, the composed rating will not 
pass over the level “3”
250. 
The indicators used for the assessment of the CAAMPL system components (except for the 
quality of the shareholders and of the management) are presented in the Annex. There are 22 
individual indicators which characterise the adequacy of the capital, the quality of the assets, the 
profitability and the liquidity of the banks. 
Simplifying  this  technique  (the  composite  rating  is calculated  as  the  arithmetic  mean  of  the 
individual ratings), we make an analysis of the Romanian banking institutions’ solidity, by means 
of the Bankscope Fitch IBCA database
 251.  
Fourteen indicators among those presented are retained in the analysis (see the indicators with 
“*” in the Annex). These indicators contain information on the capital adequacy (3 indicators), on 
the quality of the assets (6 indicators), on the profitability (3 indicators) and on the liquidity (2 
indicators). Practically, these indicators are accounting indicators and they stand for the CAPL 
(Capital, Assets, Profitability and Liquidity) system. 
In order to define the composite rating, we have kept the following assumptions:  
H1: the composite rating is calculated, in a first phase, as an arithmetic mean of the individual 
ratings; 
H2: if one of the individual indicators presents a rating equal to 5 (the worst rating), then the 
bank can not benefit from a composite rating over “3”
252; 
H3: for each score equal to 5 assigned to a component, we add 0,10 points to the composite rating 
in order to penalize the bank’s corresponding mediocre performances; 
H4: finally, the composite rating is rounded.  
This way we obtain the trend of the banking ratings for the period 1998-2006, leading to the 
possibility to identify the factors which can influence the banks’ solidity. 
 
4. The shareholders’ quality and the banks’ size effect 
In a first stage, we compare the quality of the ratings and the quality of the shareholders (Figure 
1). In theory, it is supposed that both the management and the shareholders of banking groups 
performing their activity at international level have a superior risk management capacity (because 
these institutions dispose of an adequate risk management framework). That is why we expect 
                                                       
250 Briefly, the rating categories can be interpreted as follows: Composite rating 1 – The banks are viable in all the 
aspects and generally all their five components are assessed at the level “1” or “2”. The existing deficiencies are minor 
and they can be easily eliminated. Composite rating 2 – The banks have a solid structure. Only the minor difficulties, 
which can be corrected by the Managing Board’s decisions or by the management, can be pointed out. Composite 
rating 3 – The banks require a particular attention from the supervision authorities, for one or more of the mentioned 
components. Composite rating 4 – The banks are characterized by hazardous practices and they incur serious financial 
and administrative problems which can lead to poor results. Composite rating 5 – The banks perform an unsatisfactory 
activity and apply hazardous practices. They present deficiencies and use inadequate risk management techniques.  
251 This database contains information on all the Romanian banks, except for Porsche Bank and Millennium Bank. 
The retained set includes 27 banking institutions, out of which 4 banks have Romanian majority shareholders in 2006 
(2 banks with private shareholders and 2 with public shareholders). The most important banks of the system are the 
Romanian Commercial Bank - Erste Group and the BRD - Group Société Générale, with a share of the market reaching 
29,37% and respectively 17,76% in 2006. 
252 One exception to this rule is related to the rating 5 for the indicator “immediate liquidity”, because this variable is 
equivalent to the worst score for most of the banks during the analysed period (1998-2006). The indicator is calculated 
by Bankscope which can use a method different from that applied by the NBR.   461 
 
that the banks with foreign shareholders to be more solid than those having domestic majority 
shareholders. 
 
Figure 1: The banking ratings trend correlated with the shareholders’ quality 
 
Source: Bankscope database 
 
Figure 1 shows however the opposite situation – the domestic banks are, in average, more stable 
(except for the years 2001 and 2005)
253. This observation has several explanations. In the first 
place, the Romanian Commercial Bank (the most significant bank of the system which possesses 
a good financial solidity) went through a privatization process completed only at the end of 2005. 
In the second place, the Transylvania Bank, which has Romanian majority private shareholders, 
disposes of the best composite rating during the analyzed period. Because the number of banks 
with domestic shareholders is quite reduced as compared to the number of banks with foreign 
shareholders, the composite rating of the entire banking sector is rather correlated with the rating 
of foreign shareholders banks. 
Another element influencing the quality of the ratings is the size of the banks, measured as the 
market share, which is defined by the ratio between the bank’s assets and the total assets of the 
banking sector
254. In theory, the largest banks are the most solid because they have the capacity to 
better manage their risks and to attract competent managers. They also have the capacity to 
attract  funds  when  needed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  costs  related  to  risk  management  are 
considerable for the small sized institutions and the sharp battle for the market quotas makes 
them more vulnerable. Figure 2 shows that this assumption is confirmed because the largest 
banks recorded a superior rating (the average of the composite ratings indicates a solid financial 
status for the banks belonging to this category in 2005).  
 
   
                                                       
253 We remind that a superior rating means a score equal to 1 or 2 (see left scale in Figure 1). 
254 Depending on the activity volume, there are banks included in the Category I – market share superior or equal to 
5%, in the Category II – market share between 4,99% and 1% and in the Category III – market share under 1%. 
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Figure 2: Banking ratings tendency correlated with the banks’ size 
 
Source: Bankscope database 
 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the identification of the factors which influence the ratings’ degradation and the 
calculations of the probability for the banking financial distress can be considered as a particular 
type of early warning system. 
In the case of Romania, we notice an improvement of banks’ ratings in the period 2003-2006, 
even during a credit boom period. If the large banking institutions are more solid that the small 
sized ones (the size effect – according to the theory), we can assert that this affirmation does not 
apply to shareholders quality effect. 
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Annex 
The criteria for banks’ classification depending on the indicators used for the analysis of 
quantifiable components CAPL 
 
Indicator (the 
formula) 
Interval  R
a
t
i
n
g 
Capital adequacy (C) 
Capital adequacy ratio 1 ( 
> 12%)* 
> 
15% 
well capitalized  
(equity  /  risk  weighted 
assets) 
12 - 
14,9
% 
adequately 
capitalized  
8 - 
11,9
% 
under capitalized  
5 - 
7,9% 
significantly 
under capitalized  
< 
5% 
strongly  under 
capitalized 
Capital  adequacy  ratio  2 
(> 8%) 
> 
10% 
well capitalized  
(capital  /  risk  weighted 
assets) 
8 - 
9,9% 
adequately 
capitalized 
6 - 
7,9% 
under capitalized  
4 - 
5,9% 
significantly 
under capitalized  
< 
4% 
strongly  under 
capitalized 
Equity ratio ( > 5%)*  > 
6% 
well capitalized  
(equity / total net assets)  4 - 
5,9% 
adequately 
capitalized 
3 - 
3,9% 
under capitalized  
2 -  
2,9% 
significantly 
under capitalized  
< 
2% 
strongly  under 
capitalized 464 
 
Equity  /  share  capital 
(>100%)* 
> 150% 
150 -100,0% 
80 –99,9% 
50 – 79,9% 
< 50% 
Other conditions   There  is  no  danger  to  preserve 
an adequate level of the equity 
according to the regulations.  
If  the  rating  for  the  capital 
adequacy ratio is equal to 4, the 
capital adequacy component can 
not receive a rating superior to 
that assigned to the indicator. 
In  addition,  the  bank’s 
composite rating is adjusted and 
the institution will be noted with 
a rating at the most equal to the 
component’s rating. 
If at least one of the components 
was assessed to a rating equal to 
5, the composite rating will not 
pass over the level “3”.  
Assets quality (A) 
General risqué ratio*  <  (the  average  for  the  system  - 
30% of the average for the system) 
(risk  weighted  balance-
sheet  and  off-balance-
sheet  assets  /  accounting 
value  balance-sheet  and 
off-balance-sheet assets) 
>  (the  average  for  the  system  - 
30%) 
<  (the  average  for  the  system  - 
10%) 
>  (the  average  for  the  system  - 
10%) 
<  (the  average  for  the  system  + 
10%) 
>  (the  average  for  the  system  + 
10%) 
<  (the  average  for  the  system  + 
30%) 
>  (the  average  for  the  system  + 
30%) 
 
Total  doubtful  loans  +  in 
default loans / Total credit 
portfolio (net value)* 
< 2% 
2,1 - 4% 
4,1 - 6% 
6,1 - 8% 
> 8 % 
Credit risk ratio “2” non- < 5% 465 
 
adjusted exposure 
(Loans and interests in the 
categories  “standard 
loans”,  “doubtful  loans” 
and  “doubtful  and  in 
default  loans”  /  Total 
classified  loans  and 
interests) 
5,1 - 10% 
10,1 - 20% 
20,1 - 30% 
> 30% 
Weight  of  the  banking 
loans  and  of  the 
corresponding  interests 
classified  in  “standard”, 
“doubtful”  and  “doubtful 
and  in  default  loans” 
exposition non-adjusted to 
equity and provisions* 
< 5% 
5,1 - 15% 
15,1 - 30% 
30,1 -50% 
> 50% 
Outstanding  +  doubtful 
debts   /  Total  assets  (net 
value)* 
< 2% 
2,1 - 4% 
4,1 - 6% 
6,1 - 8% 
> 8 % 
Net  doubtful  debts  <  n% 
Equity 
Cri < 30% Cp et Cp > 0 
 (net patrimony) (Cri < n% 
Cp) 
30% Cp < Cri < 50% Cp et Cp > 0 
50% Cp < Cri < 70% Cp et Cp > 0 
70% Cp < Cri < 100% Cp et Cp > 
0 
Cri > Cp or Cp < 0 
Provisions coverage level*  > 90% 
(banking  risk  reserves  + 
credit provisions) 
80 - 9,9% 
60 - 9,9% 
20 - 9,9% 
< 20% 
Provisions coverage ratio / 
Total net assets 
> 8% 
7 - 7,9% 
5 - 6,9% 
2 - 4,9% 
< 2% 
Consumption credit / Total 
assets (gross value)* 
< 50% 
50,1 - 55% 
55,1 - 60% 
60,1 - 65% 
> 65 % 
Consumption credit / loans 
from attracted funds (gross 
value)   
< 60% 
60,1 - 65% 
65,1 - 70% 
70,1 - 75% 466 
 
> 75 % 
Profitability (P) 
ROA*  > 5% 
(net  profit  /  total  net 
assets) 
4 - 4,9% 
3 - 3,9% 
0,6 - 2,9% 
< 0,6 
ROE*  > 11% 
(net profit / equity)  8 - 10,9% 
6 - 7,9% 
4 - 5,9% 
< 4% 
Basic activity profitability 
ratio 
> 150% 
(current  revenues  – 
income from provisions) / 
(current  expenditures  – 
expenditures  for 
provisions) 
125 - 150% 
115 - 124,9% 
100 - 114,9% 
< 100% 
Equity real increase index 
(depending on inflation)* 
> 120% 
110 -120% 
100 -110% 
90 -100% 
<90% 
Liquidity (L) 
Liquidity indicator  > 1,50 
(actual liquidity / required 
liquidity) 
1,20 - 1,49 
1,00 - 1,19 
0,80 - 0,99 
< 0,80 
Immediate liquidity*  > 45% 
(deposits  at  banks  (net 
value)  +  treasury 
securities)  /  loans  from 
attracted funds) 
45 - 40% 
39,9 - 35% 
34,9 - 30% 
<30% 
Consumption  credits 
(gross  value)  /  Clients’ 
deposits* 
< 85% 
85 – 104,9% 
105 –114,9% 
115 – 125% 
> 125% 
Source: Cerna et al. (2008) 
   